

Optimal mix between pay-as-you-go and funded pension systems: the case of Luxembourg

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ABSTRACT

Keywords:

1. INTRODUCTION

2. THE PENSION SYSTEM IN LUXEMBOURG

3. ANALYSIS OF THE SALARY TRAJECTORIES

3.1 A statistical method based on clustering

$$P Y_i = Y_i \quad Y_i \quad Y_i \quad N \quad Y_i = y_i \quad y_i \quad y_{i\pi}$$

$$P t = \beta + \beta t + \beta t + \beta t + \beta t$$

$$P^j Y_i$$

$$j \quad \pi_j$$

$$\pi_j \quad j$$

r

i

j

$$\Omega = \beta^1 \beta^2 \dots \beta^r \pi_j \quad j = 1, \dots, r$$

Y_i

$Y_i \quad y_{it}$

T

$$L = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \prod_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^r \pi_j \prod_{t=1}^T \phi\left(\frac{y_{it} - \beta^j x_{it}}{\sigma}\right)$$

ϕ

π_j

$$\pi_j = \frac{e^{\theta_j}}{\sum_{j=1}^r e^{\theta_j}}$$

θ_j

π_j

$r-1$

θ_j

$$\theta_1 = 0.$$

$$L = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \prod_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^r \frac{e^{\theta_j}}{\sum_{j=1}^r e^{\theta_j}} \prod_{t=1}^T \phi\left(\frac{y_{it} - \beta^j x_{it}}{\sigma}\right)$$

$$= L - k \quad N$$

k

$P_j Y_i$

i

j

$$P_j Y_i = \frac{P Y_i \pi_j}{\sum_{j=1}^r P Y_i \pi_j}$$

Y_i

$P(Y_i / j)$

3.2 The IGSS database




FIG 1: AVERAGE SALARY CURVES ACROSS THE 9 GROUPS

4. THE PENSION MODEL

4.1 Using the salary trajectories

$p_1 = 13.4\%$	$p_2 = 16.9\%$	$p_3 = 20.8\%$	$p_4 = 7.9\%$	$p_5 = 14.9\%$
$p_6 = 4.8\%$	$p_7 = 6.6\%$	$p_8 = 8.4\%$	$p_9 = 6.4\%$	

TABLE 1: GROUP SIZES

$$y_i = P_i t \quad \beta_i \quad \lambda_i = \beta_i -$$

$$\lambda_i \quad i = \quad \lambda_i \quad t \quad P_i t$$

Curve 1	Curve 2	Curve 3	Curve 4	Curve 5
$\lambda_1 = 3.07\%$	$\lambda_2 = 0.96\%$	$\lambda_3 = 1.45\%$	$\lambda_4 = 2.82\%$	$\lambda_5 = 0.19\%$
Curve 6	Curve 7	Curve 8	Curve 9	
$\lambda_6 = 2.58\%$	$\lambda_7 = 1.28\%$	$\lambda_8 = 0.48\%$	$\lambda_9 = 1.09\%$	

TABLE 2: WAGE GROWTHS IN THE NINE GROUPS

$$p_i = p'_i \quad \lambda_i \quad p_i \quad p'_i$$

$$r$$

$$T \quad d \quad S \quad \text{individuals}$$

$$T = 40 \quad S = 20 \quad d$$

$$t \quad n_i \quad i \quad t$$

$$(i, \ln(n_i)) \quad \ln(n_i) = a + bi.$$

$$N = a$$

$$d = -b -$$

$$n \quad n_{T+S} \quad N \quad N_{T+S}$$

by

$$N_i = \frac{N}{+ d^i}$$

d

BOX 1. EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC INTERGENERATIONAL RATE

d




FIG. 2: LOAD FACTOR FOR OLD AGE PENSION RECIPIENTS

d

d

d

d

4.2 Analysis of the pay-as-you-go system

τ_1

τ_1

4.2.1 Definition of the sustainability coefficient

$$\tau_1 = \frac{\tau_1}{t}$$

4.2.2 Evaluation of τ_1 as a function of d

$$N_a = N S + \frac{N S_T}{d^T}$$

$$N_p = \frac{kN}{d^{T+}} P_{T+} + \frac{kN}{d^{T+S}} P_{T+S}$$

$$\tau = \frac{N_p}{N_a} = \frac{\frac{k}{d^{T+}} P_{T+} + \frac{k}{d^{T+S}} P_{T+S}}{S + \frac{S_T}{d^T}}$$




FIG 3: SUSTAINABILITY COEFFICIENT AS A FUNCTION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC RATE

$$E \tau = \quad \sigma \tau =$$

$$CV \tau = \frac{P}{S} = c$$

d τ_1 τ_1




FIG 4: RATE OF PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF d

k

$$C = \frac{P}{S} = c$$

$$P = \gamma P \quad \frac{P}{S} = c$$

$$\frac{\gamma P}{S} = c \Leftrightarrow \gamma c = c \Leftrightarrow \gamma = \frac{c}{c}$$

$k \quad d \quad c_0 \quad \gamma$




FIG 5: FALL OF THE REPLACEMENT RATE AS A FUNCTION OF d

5. A LESS RISKY APPROACH: MIXTURE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO AND CAPITALIZATION

$(1-x)$ x

5.1 Definition of the sustainability coefficient of the funded system

T $I_j,$ j

τ_1 τ_1

τ_1 τ_2 I_j τ_2 τ_2

τ_2

$$a_j \text{ EUR} \quad S_j \quad I_j \quad i \quad \lambda_j$$

$$\tau_2 = \frac{S_j(1+i)^{T-1} + S_j(1+i)^{T-2}(1+\lambda_j) + \dots + S_j(1+\lambda_j)^{T-1}}{a_j(1+i)^{T-1} + \dots + a_j}$$

$$= \frac{S_j}{a_j(i-\lambda_j)} i \frac{(1+i)^T - (1+\lambda_j)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1}$$




FIG 6: SUSTAINABILITY COEFFICIENT OF THE FUNDED SYSTEM AS A FUNCTION OF THE MARKET RATE i

$$\tau_2 \quad i$$

$$\tau_2 \quad E(\tau_2) \quad \text{Var}(\tau_2) \quad a_j$$

$$a_j^2$$

$$E(\tau_2) = \frac{c}{a_j}$$

$$\text{Var}(\tau_2) = \frac{K}{a_j^2}$$

5.2 Definition of the overall sustainability coefficient

x

$$x \qquad \qquad \qquad \tau(x) \qquad \qquad \qquad (1-x)$$

$$\tau(x) = x\tau_1 + (1-x)\tau_2, \quad x \in [0,1].$$

$$E[\tau(x)] = xE(\tau_1) + (1-x)E(\tau_2) \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{Var}[\tau(x)] = x^2\text{Var}(\tau_1) + (1-x)^2\text{Var}(\tau_2)$$

5.3 The sustainability of the system

a

$$U = U(a)$$

$$U'(a) \leq 0$$

$$G(x) = \frac{\text{Var}(\tau_1) - \text{Var}[\tau(x)]}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)} \geq G^* \qquad (1)$$

$$x = x^*$$

$$U = U(a)$$

$$G^*$$

/

T

$\tau(x)$

x


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
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T

With an annuity of $a = 2000$ €, it is impossible to reduce the risk of variability to the threshold of 0.5 .



With an annuity of $a = 2650$ €, it is possible to reduce the risk of variability to the threshold of 0.5 .



$$K = \text{Var} \left[\frac{S_j}{(1-\lambda_j)} i \frac{(1+i)^T - (1+\lambda_j)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1} \right].$$

$$\text{Var}[\tau(x)] \leq (1 - G^*) \text{Var}(\tau_1),$$

$$\text{Var}[\tau(x)] = x^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1) + (1 - x)^2 \text{Var}(\tau_2) = x^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1) + (1 - x^2) \frac{K}{a^2} \leq \text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*),$$

$$(K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1))x^2 - 2Kx - a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*) + K \leq 0 \quad (2)$$

$$\min [(K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1))x^2 - 2Kx - a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*) + K] \leq 0$$

$$-a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1) \frac{(a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1) - G^* K - G^* a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1))}{K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)} \leq 0,$$

$$x = \frac{K}{K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)}.$$

$$y = (K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1))x^2 - 2Kx - a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*) + K$$

$$a^2 \geq \frac{G^* K}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*)}$$

$U(a)$

$$a^* = \sqrt{\frac{G^* K}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*)}}.$$

$$\min[(K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1))x^2 - 2Kx - a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*) + K] = 0.$$

$$x^* = \frac{K}{K + a^2 \text{Var}(\tau_1)} = \frac{K}{K + \frac{G^* K}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*)}} = 1 - G^*.$$

5.4 Conclusion: the optimal annuity

$$x = x^*$$

$$G(x) = \frac{\text{Var}(\tau_1) - \text{Var}[\tau(x)]}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)} \geq G^*$$

$$x^* = 1 - G^*$$

$$a^* = \sqrt{\frac{G^* K}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)(1 - G^*)}}$$

$$K = \text{Var} \left[\frac{S_j}{(1 - \lambda_j)} \right] i \frac{(1+i)^T - (1+\lambda_j)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1}$$

$$a^* \quad x^*$$

$$G^* = \frac{\text{Var}(\tau_1) - \text{Var}[\tau(x)]}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)}$$

and

$$1 - G^* = \frac{\text{Var}(\tau_2) - \text{Var}[\tau(x)]}{\text{Var}(\tau_2)}$$

	4466	713	1448	5231	220	6364	2809	743	3140

$$\text{Var}[\tau(x)] \leq \text{Var}(\tau_1) = 0.68$$

$$\text{Var}[\tau(x)] = 0.34$$

6. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

d	sustainability index

	9,7%	2,9%	4,4%	8,9%	0,6%	8,1%	3,9%	1,4%	3,3%

	51,7%	90,2%	80,7%	55,3%	99,6%	59,2%	84,2%	97,3%	87,7%

$$K = \text{Var} \left[\frac{S_j}{(1-\lambda_j)} i \frac{(1+i)^T - (1+\lambda_j)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1} \right]$$

G^*

$$a^* \geq \sqrt{\frac{K}{\text{Var}(\tau_1)}}$$

G^*

x^*

G^*

	48,3%	9,8%	19,3%	44,7%	0,4%	40,8%	15,8%	2,7%	12,3%

$$x^* = 1 - G^*$$

$$G^*$$

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

